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Abstract We develop a model of regulation of environmental risks in a het-
erogeneous industry when policy makers are sensitive to uncertainties about
the processes generating the risks. Optimal source reduction capacity is shown
to vary according to site suitability. Optimal source reduction capacity and
the implicit value of risk reduction increase as risk standards become more
stringent and as aversion to uncertainty grows. Taxes are more equitable than
standards whenever the emissions generating the risks are all-or-nothing.
These results are illustrated for a case of public health regulation of dairy
wastes producing enhanced risk of acute gastroenteritis through contamina-
tion of a shellfishery. Aversion to uncertainty influences investment in pollution
control substantially. The premium in pollution control costs imposed by an
increase in the required margin of safety increases as aversion to uncertainty
grows and as the risk standard becomes more stringent, as do the implicit
value of risk reduction and optimal tax. Taxes are more equitable than stan-
dards for lax risk standards but become less so as the risk standard becomes
more stringent.
Contamination of marine resources by industrial, agricultural and municipal
wastes is a key environmental concern. Pollution of marine systems impairs both
the quantity and quality of services provided. Commercial and sport fish and
shellfish harvests may be reduced because of gradual increases in pollution levels
or chemical spills. Consumption of fish and shellfish may become more risky
because of bioaccumulation of heavy metals and pesticides or because of microbial
contamination from sewage and agricultural wastes. Populations of various spe-
cies may decline, sometimes to the point of extinction. Recreational waters may
become unswimmable and recreational areas unusable because of water contam-
ination or oil/chemical spills.
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Regulation pertaining to these problems aims at achieving some sort of balance
between the value of Ihe activities creating the pollution and that of the marine
resources affected. Thus, an assessment of the tradeoffs between polluters" pro-
duction, the quantity of marine resource output (fish harvests, number of rec-
reation sites, species diversity), and the quality of marine resource output (human
health risks from fish or water contamination) is essential for policy determination.
One of the central problems in obtaining accurate assessments of these tradeofl's
is that there is typically a great deal of uncertainty about the environmental effects.
The ways in which contaminants enter and disseminate through the environment
tend to be monitored and modeled only incompletely. Stochastic factors such as
weather patterns also tend to have a large degree of influence on them. Many of
the fundamental mechanisms underlying physiological responses—both in hu-
mans and animals—are not understood well at this time. Moreover, many phys-
iological responses have a multiplicity of causes and contributing factors, making
attribution of causality a severe problem.
Because of the influence of random elements like weather or because of unob-
servable factors like differences in susceptibility to pollutants, it is often possible
to characterize environmental effects only in terms of probabilities of occurrence.
We will refer to the probability of occurrence of an adverse outcome as a risk.
(Note that this usage, while common in the environmental and health sciences,
differs from standard economics terminology.)
Estimates of these environmental risks are typically subject to uncertainty.
Limitations on basic scientific knowledge and on the information available within
a regulatory time frame often make it impossible to specify reliably what such
probabilities of occurrence are. Because the relationship between the environ-
mental risk and the variables that generate it is not known with certainty, the risk
estimates used for policy evaluation are subject to error. We will use the term
uncertainty as a measure of the magnitude of this error. For this reason we say
that there is typically uncertainty about environmental risk.
The general attitude toward these contamination problems emphasizes pre-
vention: Policy is increasingly expected to be prospective rather than reactive.
This orientation forces regulators to rely on simulation models about whose struc-
ture and parameters there is usually considerable uncertainty. Also, the public
tends to be quite sensitive to severe outcomes like cancers, birth defects, large
wildlife kills or outbreaks of food poisoning—even when these outcomes arc
rather unlikely. Thus, regulatory decisions need to be based on methodologies
which incorporate uncertainty explicitly.
In an earlier paper (Lichtenberg and Zilberman) we proposed a method for
constructing uncertainty-adjusted cost curves for environmental risk reduction as
a means of meeting this need. This paper applies that approach to a case of human
health risk from microbia! shellfish contamination. We begin with a discussion of
our approach, its uses, and its characteristics. We then use this aproach to develop
a model of optimal investment in facilities to control stochastic pollution in a
heterogeneous industry. The model suggests that runoff control measures should
differ across sites; when runoff control is all-or-nothing, discrimination among
producers will be especially pronounced. In such cases taxing pollution will tend
to be more equitable than imposing standards. Finally, we apply the runoff control
model to the case of contamination of oyster beds in Tomales Bay, California by
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approach; to examine how preferences regarding uncertainty affect regulatory
choices; and to examine the differences in equitability between alternative policy
instruments such as taxes and standards.
Constructing Uncertainty-Adjusted Cost Curves for Environmental Risk
Reduction
Our approach to constructing uncertainty-adjusted cost curves for risk reduction
essentially involves combining a probabilistic environmental risk assessment—a
type of risk assessment that has become increasingly widespread in recent years—
with a safety rule decision mechanism. The resulting estimates of uncertainty-
compensated tradeoffs between risk and social cost can then be used for policy
determination using formal decision criteria (cost-benefit, risk-benefit) or for sub-
jective evaluation of regulatory alternatives.
This procedure has a number of appealing characteristics. First, it makes use
of the full range of information available in a practical manner. Even though all
of the uncertainty present cannot generally be parameterized, it is important to
incorporate as much as possible into regulatory decisions. Second, this approach
is more amenable to interdisciplinary cooperation. It utilizes the kinds of infor-
mation produced by risk analysis and is equivalent to using confidence intervals
for statistical decision making, the method preferred in the natural sciences. Third,
because safety rules have been used in a variety of economic applications, they
are well understood. Moreover, they have been shown to provide good approx-
imations of expected utility decisions in a number of empirical contexts (Thomson
and Hazell 1972). Fourth, the safety rule approach corresponds quite closely to
the terms of much of the relevant legislation, which requires regulators to provide
adequate protection for public health or the environment within a sufficient margin
of safety. It also corresponds to a "disaster-avoidance" approach to decision
making which is widespread among the public and the regulatory community.
Thus, our approach describes the preference structures of decision makers in
many instances.
A set of uncertainty-adjusted cost curves for risk reduction can be derived as
follows. Assume that N regulatory instruments X , XN are available. Let
C(X) represent the social cost ofa set of policy choices. It will include such items
as costs of decontaminating the environment, costs of installing exposure reduc-
tion devices, welfare losses sustained by consumers and producers due to regu-
lation-induced productivity decreases/cost increases, and government expendi-
tures on monitoring and enforcement. Environmental risk is assumed to be a
function of policy, R(X). in a manner detlned by an environmental risk assessment.
Let R() denote the maximum allowable risk (risk standard) and P represent the
frequency with which this standard is met (margin of safety). The regulatory
problem can be defined as choosing a policy mix Xj, . . . , XN to minimize the
cost of ensuring that the risk standard Ro is maintained with a given margin of
safety P. This problem can be written formally as
minC(X, XN) (1)
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Pr[R(X) > R,,l < I - P. (2)
Repeated application of this procedure letting Ro vary parametricaliy and keep-
ing P fixed yields a set of minimum cost tradeoffs between the risk standard
exceeded only with frequency 1 -~ P and the total social cost of regulation
C(Xl, . . . , XN). This set amounts to an uncertainty-adjusted cost curve for risk
reduction C(Ro,P). Repeating this procedure over the range of P yields a complete
set of such cost curves.
Note that the margin of safety. P. essentially represents the decision maker's
aversion to uncertainty. The larger P is, the greater will be the emphasis on the
right hand tail of the risk distribution and hence the greater will be the weight
placed on uncertainty in choosing a mix of regulatory instruments.
In our earlier paper, we analyzed the optimal mix of regulatory instruments
for the risk model proposed for cancer risk assessment by Crouch and Wilson
(1981). This model assumes that risk can be expressed well by a multiplicative
combination of parameters and that the risk exceeded with any given probability
can be represented by a weighted sum ofthe mean and standard deviation ofthe
risk." We showed that the optimal policy will consist of a portfolio of measures,
some specializing in reducing mean risk and others specializing in reducing un-
certainty about risk. Emphasis on reducing uncertainty becomes greater as aver-
sion to uncertainty grows, possibly even to the point where performance with
respect to average risk actually declines. Emphasis on mean risk reductions is
greater for more toxic contaminants, for less controllable risks, and for cases
where the background uncertainty is large.
The set ofthe costs associated with optimal policy portfolios for all risk stan-
dards and a given margin of safety P makes up a cost curve for risk reduction
with margin of safety P. It is decreasing in the risk standard, i.e.. downward
sloping in cost-risk space. An increase in toxicity, in uncontrollability, or in back-
ground uncertainty will increase cost, i.e., push this curve up and to the right.
Cost curves associated with higher margins of safety (greater aversion to uncer-
tainty) will lie up and to the right as well.
The slopes of these cost curves, given by the set of lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the constraint (2). represent the marginal cost of reducing risk with
a given margin of safety. As such, they give an estimate of social willingness to
pay for risk reductions implied by a specific standard with a given level of aversion
to uncertainty. Thus, they can be used to construct a measure of the value of risk
reduction with a given margin of safety. In our analysis ofthe Crouch and Wilson
risk model, we showed that this marginal cost of risk reduction increases as aver-
sion to uncertainty increases and as the risk standard, toxicity, uncontrollability.
and background uncertainty decrease.
These cost curves can be used to generate regulatory decisions using formal
methodologies or subjective comparisons of alternatives. For example, cost-ben-
efit solutions can be derived for any given margin of safety by equating marginal
' This assumption is not very restrictive. Such representations can be derived for any
probability distribution using Chebyshev's inequality or the partial moment methods pro-
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benefit and marginal cost; risk-benefit solutions can be derived by requiring that
the risk/cost ratio be consistent with historical experience (Starr 1969).
Mean Versus Uncertainty-Adjusted Standards for Environmental Risks
Consider the case where effluent from an industry enters a body of water and
thereby creates risks to public health (e.g., contaminated drinking water, accu-
mulation of toxics in fish and wildlife) or to the environment (e.g.. birth defects
in fish or waterfowl, fish kills). Suppose that effluent depends on random factors
like rainfall so that these risks vary randomly over time. Let R denote the risk
of concern, that is. the probability of occurrence of an adverse effect such as
illness or death from consumption of contaminated water or wildlife. Assume that
risk is proportional to the aggregate effluent emitted by the industry M, that is,
R = wM. (3)
Aggregate effluent M is a random variable which is a function pf a random factor
e and of source reduction measures undertaken by the industry.
Suppose that the industry is heterogeneous, specifically that the suitability of
sites for source reduction varies from site to site. Let a be an indicator of site
indicator of site suitability for source reduction. Assume that a is continuous and
normalized such that zero denotes the greatest suitability (measured as lowest
cost of construction for any capacity) and one denotes the least. Let g(a) represent
the maximum potential eftluent emission from sites of suitability a. For analytical
convenience, assume that g(a) is continuous. Let h(X(a). e) denote the proportion
of total pollution emitted during a state of nature e (say, a rainfall of size e) at a
site of suitability, a having source reduction capacity X(a). Clearly h will be de-
creasing in source reduction (hx < 0). Assume that it is increasing in the random
factor e (he > 0). Let F(e) and f(e) represent the probability distribution and density
of e. The average risk from effluent of the industry is
E(R) = w j^j^ h(X(a), e)g(a)f(e)dade (4)
while the risk attained with a margin of safety P, that is, exceeded only with
frequency I - P, is
Rp = w J^ h(X(a), e(P))g(a)da (5)
where e(P) is the critical level of the random factor e exceeded only with prob-
ability 1 - P.
Let C(X(a), a) denote the cost per unit of pollution of source reduction capacity
X(a) at a site of suitability a. Assume that it is increasing in capacity (Cx > 0)
and decreasing in suitability iC^ > 0). It seems reasonable to assume in addition
that Cxa > 0. that is, that the marginal cost of source reduction capacity increases
as sites become less suitable. The relevant decision problem is to choose a set of216 Erik Lichtenberg and David Zilberman
source reduction measures to minimize the total cost of achieving a risk standard
Ro either on the average or with a margin of safety P. This can be expressed as
an optimal control problem of choosing a set X(a) over the suitability range 0 s
a < I to
min I C(X(a), a)g(a)da (6)
subject to the constraints
E(R) < Ro (7)
or
Rp — Ro- (8)
Consider first the choice of source reduction capacities under a mean risk
standard. The necessary conditions include
Cx -vw 1^ hx(X(a), e)f(e)de = 0 (9)
for all a. where v < 0 Is the costate variable, plus the constraint (7). It is evident
from the structure ofthe problem that v is a constant, that is, that it is invariant
with respect to site suitability a (dv/da ^ 0). Hereafter we will refer to the absolute
value of V as the value of risk reduction. Condition (9) states that on every type
of site the marginal cost of additional capacity should equal the value of the
marginal reduction in risk averaged across all states of nature.
The sufficient conditions include
Q = Cxx - vw r hxx(X(a), e)f(e)de > 0 (10)
Je
for all a, which will hold whenever Cxx.hxx > 0 as one would expect for all a.
Optimal source reduction capacity decreases as sites become less suitable
(dX*/da = - CxJQ < 0). As in the case of Crouch and Wilson (1981) risk model,
it can be shown that optimal source reduction capacity and the value of risk
reduction decrease as the risk standard becomes more lax (Ro increases).^
The necessary conditions for attaining a risk standard under a margin of safety
P at minimum cost include
Cx - vwhx(X(a), e(P)) - 0 (11)
^ Let TC denote the total cost of source reduction. Because v is invariant with respect
to a, it equals dTC/dR() < 0. As the risk standard becomes more lax (Ro increases), total
cost declines: therefore, dv/dR(, > 0, the value of risk reduction declines. Total differ-
entiation of Equation (9) implies that
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for all a, plus the constraint (8). In this case the marginal cost of additional source
reduction capacity equals the value of the marginal reduction in risk that is ex-
ceeded only with frequency 1 - P. The sufficient conditions include
Z = Cxx - vwhxx(X(a), e(P)) > 0 (12)
for all a. Optimal source reduction capacity again decreases as sites become less
suitable (dX*/da = -CxJZ < 0) while v is invariant across sites. The value of
risk reduction increases as aversion to uncertainty increases (dv/dP < 0). Optimal
source reduction capacity may decrease at some types of site; however, the effects
of increases must outweigh the effects of any decreases; that is, the overall source
reduction effort must increase. As before, a more lax standard implies smaller
source reduction capacity at every site and a decrease in the value of risk
reduction.'^
Consider the effect of an increase in the pure randomness of rainfall, as char-
acterized by a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the random factor e.
Because the mean is unchanged, such an increase in randomness will have no
effect on optimal source reduction capacity in the mean risk case. It will, however,
affect optimal holding pond capacity in the uncertainty-adjusted risk standard
case: An increase in the weight in the tail of the distribution of e to the right of
e(P) will force an increase in e(P) and therefore increase optimal source reduction
capacity at all sites.
In many important cases at hand the effectiveness of source reduction h(X(a),
e) is modeled more realistically as dichotomous rather than continuous. For ex-
ample, the pollution control mechanism may contain all effiuent up to a given
capacity and release it all when that capacity is exceeded, so that pollution re-
leased at any rate is either zero or the maximum potential effluent level at that
site.
The structure of the mean risk problem changes very little in such cases.
Because pollution is all-or-nothing, average pollution emitted from each site will
be li - F(X(a))]g(a) where 1 - F(X(a)) is the probability that the random factor
exceeds source reduction capacity at that site. The marginal reduction in risk
averaged across all states of nature becomes -Fx(X(a))g(a). Equations (7), (9)
and (10) are easily modified. It is readily aparent that the comparative static results
derived for the continuous case continue to hold.
The structure of the safety rule decision problem, on the other hand, does
change significantly. When pollution is all-or-nothing the optimal source reduction
program for attaining a risk standard Ro with a margin of safety P has two char-
acteristics: (1) all source reduction installed should have a capacity of e(P), and
' Differentiation of the constraint (8) implies that /d hx(dX*/dP)g(a)da =
/() heepg(a)da < 0. that is, the effects of increases in some reduction capacity must out-
weigh the effects of any decreases (recall that hx is negative for all a). It must be true that
dX*/dP is positive for some a. Total differentiation of Equation (9) implies that dv/dP =
(Q/whx)dX*/dP - (vhxcep/hx). For a such that dX*/dP is positive, this implies that
dv/dP < 0 as long as hxe — 0, that is. when additional pollution from a larger value of the
random factor e (greater rainfall) does not increase as source reduction capacity increases,
as one would expect. Since v is a constant, this result holds for al! sites. While source
reduction capacity increases at least some sites, it will decrease on any site where dv/dP
> - vhxeep/hx. The proof for dv/dRo > 0 and dX*/dRo < 0 mirrors that given in footnote
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(2) source reduction measures should be applied only to the most suitable sites,
specifically on sites 0 ^ a < a* where a* is defined by
I
^ g(a)da = Ro. (13)
The reasons are as follows. First, all source reduction installed should have
capacity e(P) because smaller less costly capacities contribute nothing to runoff
prevention when the random event is of size e(P) while larger capacities prevent
runoff at higher cost but no more effectively than capacities e(F). Therefore the
least-cost solution is either to build source reduction capacity e(P) on sites of
suitability a or not to build at all. It follows that source reduction should be
installed only on the most suitable (cheapest) sites, that is, on sites up to the
critical level of suitability a* required to meet the risk standard Ro, as defined in
Equation (13). This critical level of suitability decreases as the risk standard be-
comes more lax (da*/dRo = l/wg(a*) < 0) but is unaffected by aversion to un-
certainty (da*/dP = 0). Optimal source reduction capacity at each type of site
increases as aversion to uncertainty grows but is unaffected by changes in the
risk standard.
Total cost in this case is
TC = j^ C(e(P), a)g(a)da. (14)
It increases as aversion to uncertainty grows {dTC/dP ^ /g* Cxepg(a)da > 0) and
as the risk standard becomes more stringent (dTC/dRo = C(e(P), a*)g(a*) •
(da*/dRo) < 0). The value of risk reduction (- v) equals - dTC/dRo or C(e(P),a*)/
w, which is proportional to the cost of building source reduction capacity of e(P)
at sites of the critical level of suitability a*. It decreases as the risk standard
becomes more lax (dv/dRo = [-Ca/w]lda*/dRo] > 0) and as aversion to uncer-
tainty declines (dv/dP = -Cxep/w < 0).
When pollution is all-or-nothing, imposing optimal standards for source re-
duction on a heterogeneous industry is noticeably more inequitable under a margin
of safety approach than under a mean risk approach. U nder the latter, even though
there is discrimination (producers in more favorable sites will be required to install
greater source reduction capacity at greater cost), all producers bear a share of
the cost of pollution control. Under the former, though, some producers are re-
quired to install relatively large source reduction capacity at high cost while others
bear no responsibility for pollution control.
Interestingly, it will be more equitable to implement a given standard for en-
vironmental risk under either approach by imposing a tax on actual emissions
rather than setting source reduction standards. Under either approach the optimal
tax per unit of emissions will be - vw, proportional to the value of risk reduction.
Under a mean risk approach, the expected tax payment of a producer on a site
of suitability a will be - vwll - F(X(a))l. Producers at more suitable sites will
install larger source reduction capacity and therefore have higher pollution control
costs but will have lower expected tax payments. Producers at less suitable sites
will pay less in pollution control costs but will have higher expected tax payments.
Under the margin of safety approach, if the tax were imposed only on emissions
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installing source reduction would pay no tax. Producers not installing source
reduction would have expected tax payments of PC(E(P), a*)/w. If P/w > 1, as
might happen if w were small, they would pay more than producers at sites of
critical suitability a*.
Microbial Contamination of Shelirish in Tomales Bay
Pollution has had a severe impact on shellfisheries throughout the United States.
Shellfish harvests have declined significantly because of pollution, overfishing.
and natural phenomena. Many fisheries have been closed permanently for public
health reasons; many others are subjected to recurring temporary closures for the
same cause (Larkin and Hunt 1982).
In earlier times, the main public health concern was the spread of typhoid
from consumption of sewage-contaminated shellfish. More recently, the focus of
concern has shifted to hepatitis A and other viral diseases, although salmonellosis
gastroenteritis is still a significant problem. Alarm over the health risks from
consumption of raw shellfish has heightened in recent months. For example, a
recent editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine urged that people cease
eating raw shellfish altogether because the risks of gastroenteric illness are simply
unacceptable (Du Pont 1986). This sentiment is shared by much of the medical
community (Eckholm 1986).
Tomales Bay, located about 50 miles north of San Francisco, houses a small
cultivated oyster fishery. The main threat to the fishery comes from effluent runoff
from the surrounding dairy industry. Under normal conditions, runoff from the
manure spread over each dairy's disposal area will have a negligible effect on
water quality and hence on the fishery. During severe rainstorms, though, the
manure will be washed into the watershed. The resulting fecal contamination of
the bay will lead to contamination of the oyster beds. If the water quality around
the oyster beds fails to meet public health standards, the fishery will be closed.
Current standards, expressed in terms of the most probable number (MPN) of
bacteria, are median values of 70 MPN/IOO ml water for total coliform bacteria
and 14 MPN/IOO ml water for fecal coliform bacteria (Hunt 1977).
Contamination can be reduced by constructing holding ponds at the dairies.
Each pond will retain effluent up to a fixed capacity. Because the manure floats.
it will be washed into the watershed as soon as that capacity is exceeded. The
severity and frequency of pollution will thus depend on the capacities of the
holding ponds built. Current regulations require all dairies to maintain facilities
to hold a 10-year 24-hour rainfall in addition to a maximum average rainfall of
5.75 inches occurring in the previous three weeks (Rafter et al. 1974).
Hochman, Zilberman, and Just (1977) analyzed optimal regulation of the To-
males Basin under the present policy at uniform regulation of dairies. Their anal-
ysis suggested that to maximize the sum of fishery and dairy profits all dairies
should be required to construct ponds capable of holding 50-year 24-hour rainfall
events.
This paper extends their analysis to encompass (I) a full set of standards for
acute gastroenteritis risk, and (2) heterogeneity among dairies. We develop a
model of acute gastroenteritis risk from raw oyster consumption. We then combine
it with Hochman, Zilberman, and Just's data on runoff control costs using the
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justed, cost-efficient tradeoffs between source reduction costs and gastroenteritis
risk. Because of topographical differences, the costs of constructing a holding
pond of any given capacity tend to vary widely among dairies: Hochman, Zil-
berman, and Just's data indicate that they may differ by a factor of four or more.
This suggests that any given standard can be achieved at a lower overall cost by
discriminating among dairies, i.e., requiring dairies in more favorable locations to
build large holding ponds and those in less favorable locations to build smaller ones.
Risk of Acute Gastroenteritis from Microbial Shellfish Contamination
For simplicity, the risk of acute gastroenteritis from microbial shellfish contam-
ination was modeled as a multiplicative combination of variables reflecting water
quality, microbial uptake by oysters, and human physiological response.
Each cow was assumed to produce an identical constant amount of manure,
and each pound of manure was assumed to have a constant, identical microbial
content. The microbial content of manure was assumed to be measured accurately
by the coliform count. Manure in runoff was assumed to be mixed uniformly in
the bay waters around the oyster beds. This is undoubtedly an oversimplification
but does constitute a reasonable first approximation (see for example the data
presented by the Northeast Technical Services Unit 1980).
Under these assumptions, water quality around the oyster beds will be in-
versely proportional to the number of cows generating effluent. To estimate this
constant of proportionality, q, it was assumed that during extremely heavy rain-
storms efluent runs off at all dairies and that this effluent Is the sole source of
microbial contamination as measured by the fecal coliform count. This ignores
the contributions from human sources such as defective septic tanks, which are
important in certain areas but of secondary significance overall. The maximum
fecal coliform count measured over a broad range of oyster beds was 16.(K)0
MPN/100 ml water (Northeast Technical Services Unit 1980). The total number
of cows at dairies in the watershed, as reported by Hochman, Zilberman, and
Just was 13,200, implying a value of q == 1.2 MPN/100 ml water per cow.
Uptake of microbial contaminants by the oyster population was assumed to
be proportional to water quality around the oyster beds. This parameter, u, was
estimated using data presented by Andrews et al. (1975) in their study of fecal
coliform counts as an indicator of bacteriological contamination. They reported
percentages of oyster samples testing positive for salmonella for five ranges of
fecal coliform counts. These percentages were regressed on the midpoints ofthe
fecal coliform count ranges without a constant term, with an additional assumption
that the maximum observed fecal coliform count was 16,000 MPN/100 ml water,
to obtain a estimate of u = 0.000057. The standard deviation of this estimate was
0.000022.*
•* This approach has several shortcomings. First, it assumes that the presence of sal-
monella in oyster meat indicates a sufficient level of microbial contamination to cause
illness. It would be preferable to measure the extent to which the meat is contaminated
as well; however, the literature on dose-response relations looks only at whether or not
the shellfish are contaminated, so this additional level of detail would add little of substance
to the analysis. More significant is the implicit assumption that the presence of salmonella
is also a good indicator of viral contamination. The results of a number of studies indicate
the contrary, specifically that the fecal coliform count in surrounding waters tends not to
be such a good indicator of viral contamination (see. for instance, Gerba et al. 1980).
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A number of studies has shown that bacterial and viral populations remain
relatively constant after processing and cold storage for several weeks (Kelley
and Arcisz 1954; Wilson and McCleskey 1951; Erickson, Vasconcetos, and Pres-
nell 1967; DiGirolamo, Liston, and Matches 1970; Hood, Baker, and Singleton
1984). In any case, because this study is concerned with incremental risk from
water contamination, additional contamination from shucking and handling and
improper storage were ignored.
The probability of contracting gastroenteritis from eating contaminated oysters
was assumed to be proportional to the proportion of oysters contaminated. Varia-
tions in this dose-response relation due to variations in the number of oysters
eaten or the extent of contamination of each oyster were ignored. No data on
bacteriological poisonings from consuming contaminated shellfish were known to
us, so epidemiological studies of viral infections were used exclusively. Several
such studies investigated incidents where guests at large parties had been served
contaminated shellfish. The proportion of people consuming these shellfish who
contracted gastroenteritis ranged from .36 to .65 (Gill et al. 1983; Gunnet al. 1982;
Morse et al. 1986). The dose-response parameter d was given a value .45, in accord
with the incidence of gastroenteritis reported by Gunn et al. and the combined
incidence of gastroenteritis and hepatitis reported by Morse et al.
The constant of proportionality w relating effluent to acute gastroenteritis risk
thus equals the product duq, or (l.2)(0.000057)(0.45) = 0.00003078.
We will consider only one source of uncertainty (e), namely the randomness
of 24-hour rainfall. The probability distribution of 24-hour rainfall was modeled
as a Pearson type III distribution as in Hochman. Zilberman, and Just. Using data
from the California Department of Water Resources (1974) they estimated that
the 24-hour rainfall exceeded with probability 1 - P was 2.928 + K(I - P)0.413,
where K(I - P) was chosen to correspond to a Pearson type III distribution with
a skewness of 1.3.
Empirical Results
Optimal patterns of holding pond construction in the Tomales Basin were esti-
mated for three margins of safety commonly used in public health regulation—
90. 95 and 99 percent—plus the safety level corresponding to average rainfall
which, because it places zero weight on the standard deviation of rainfall, cor-
responds to neutrality with respect to uncertainty (Lichtenberg and Zilberman).
In the case at hand neutrality toward uncertainty corresponds to a safety margin
of 40 percent.
These optimal policies were estimated by simulating the effects of imposing
alternative levels of a per-cow tax on pollution. For each level of the pollution
tax and each margin of safety, dairy operators were assumed to minimize the
total cost of holding pond construction plus expected tax payments using the rules
derived above. The corresponding risk standard was then estimated from the
resulting pollution levels. Holding pond construction costs at each dairy were
estimated using the data on the annualized cost of building a holding pond with
capacity sufficient to hold no more than the corresponding 24-hour rainfall given
the average maximum rainfall of 5.75 inches in the preceding three weeks as
reported by Hochman, Zilberman, and Just.









Figure 1. Total cost and optimal taxes—alternative risk standards
structing holding ponds increases as the risk standard becomes more stringent.
The cost of meeting any given standard increases as aversion to uncertainty (as
measured by the margin of safety) increases.
It can also be seen that the premium paid for reductions in uncertainty (that
is. the additional cost of meeting a given risk standard due to an increase in the
margin of safety) increases as the risk standard becomes more stringent. For
example, meeting a very lax risk standard costs about $40 more under a 99 percent
margin of safety than under a 95 percent margin of safety. This implies an average
'^uncertainty premium" of about $10 for each percentage point increase in the
margin of safety. At very stringent risk standards, this uncertainty premium in-
creases to over $3,300. The uncertainty premium can also be seen to increase as
aversion to uncertainty increases. The uncertainty premium implied by a move
from a 90 to 95 percent margin of safety ranges from under $4 for very lax risk
standards to about $1140 for very stringent risk standards, while that implied by
a move from neutrality toward uncertainty to a 90 percent margin of safety ranges
from under $1 to about $190.
Both the marginal cost of risk reduction and the optimal tax associated with
any given risk standard behave similarly to total cost, increasing as the risk stan-
dard becomes more stringent and as aversion to uncertainty grows. The marginal
cost of risk reduction ranges from about $79,000 for very lax risk standards to
about $516,000 for very stringent risk standards under neutrality toward uncer-
tainty, from $88,000 to $577,000 under a 90 percent margin of safety, from $94,000
to $615,000 under a 95 percent margin of safety and from $104,000 to $702,000
under a 99 percent margin of safety. The optimal tax ranges from $2.00 per cow
for very lax risk standards to almost $16.00 per cow for very stringent risk stan-
dards under neutrality toward uncertainty, from $2.10 to $17.80 under a 90 percentMarine Contamination under Environmental Uncertainty 223
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Figure 2. Equitability of taxes versus standards
0.5
margin of safety, from $2.20 to $19.00 under a 95 percent margin of safety, and
from $2.35 to $21.60 under a 99 percent margin of safety. In both cases the pre-
mium imposed by greater aversion to uncertainty clearly increases as (1) aversion
to uncertainty increases and (2) the risk standard becomes more stringent.
Finally, consider the relative equity effects of meeting a given risk target using
taxes versus standards. Figure 2 shows the ratio of tax payments to the sum of
tax payments and construction costs over the range of feasible risk standards
under neutrality toward uncertainty and under a 99 percent safety margin. When
the risk standard is very lax, the share of tax payments is very large because it
is optimal for only a few dairies to build holding ponds. Under such conditions
imposing a tax will be much more equitable than imposing a standard. As the risk
standard becomes more stringent, the number of dairies investing in runoff control
facilities grows, and therefore imposing a standard becomes increasingly less ine-
quitable. When the risk standard is very stringent, only a few dairies continue to
pollute, and therefore the difference in the equity effects between the two policy
approaches disappears.
One can also see from Figure 2 that the share of tax payments rises—albeit
only slightly—as aversion to uncertainty increases, so that the inequities gen-
erated by imposing standards are greater for higher margins of safety. It can be
verified that this difference increases as aversion to uncertainty grows.
Concluding Remarks
We have argued that uncertainty tends to matter a great deal in environmental
policy problems—including those concerning marine pollution—because of the
incompleteness of the knowledge base from which decisions must be made and
because of the expressed preferences of the general public. This implies in turn224 Erik Lichtenberg and David Zilberman
that formal methods for making environmental policy decisions should incorporate
uncertainty explicitly. We have proposed once such methodology, which applies
a safety rule decision mechanism to a probabilistic model of environmental risk
to generate uncertainty-adjusted cost curves for risk reduction. We argued that
this approach combines several theoretically appealing features and practical
usefulness.
In this paper we develop a model that applies this approach to a broad class
of stochastic runoff control problems and illustrate its use in an empirical analysis
of microbiai contamination of oysters in Tomales Bay by dairy wastes. Calculation
of the uncertainty-adjusted cost curves was feasible and generated some inter-
esting results. The optimal level of investment in runoff control was shown to
differ significantly across heterogeneous sites. The cost of meeting any given
standard for risk of acute gastroenteritis was shown to increase as aversion to
uncertainty increases. The premium paid for uncertainty reduction was shown to
increase as the risk standard becomes more stringent and as aversion to uncer-
tainty rises. The marginal cost of risk reduction and optimal tax behaved in a
similar manner.
Regarding the choice of pollution control policy approaches, taxes were shown
to be much more equitable than standards for lax risk standards. The equity
differentials between the two approaches was shown to decline as the risk standard
becomes increasingly stringent and as aversion to uncertainty falls.
In sum, we believe that the analysis shows that our proposed methodology
can be a useful tool for environmental decision making and yields some interesting
perspectives on a number of aspects of environmental policy questions.
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